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BrunoMölder’sMind Ascribed oers an important and impressive criticism of sub-
stantial naturalistic accounts of mental activity that predominate much recent phi-
losophy of mind, as part of a defense of a relatively deationary form of interpre-
tivism. However, I suspect that Mölder has overly downplayed normative aspects
of mental ascription, and that he could protably enlist the work of those who take
Sellars seriously to explain how the actual behavior of subjects of ascription can de-
part so dramatically from the norms of rationality to which they are properly held.
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1. To my mind, the animating thought behind interpretivism is something
like the following: mental activity as such is best understood in terms of
the activity of ascribers or attributors of mental states as they go about at-
tempting to interpret the linguistic and otherwise intentional behavior of
their subjects of interpretation. Davidson and Dennett are both widely and
justly recognized for advancing distinct and inuential interpretivist views,
though as Bruno Mölder successfully shows inMind Ascribed (2010)1, their
respective positions are not the only, nor perhaps even the best, ways of
working out this basic interpretivist insight. So if one thought that those
two gures exhaust the pantheon of pioneers staking claims in the interpre-
tivist landscape, then one should heartily congratulate Mölder for success-
fully achieving his stated aim of “put[ting] interpretivism back on the map,
that is, [of showing] that it is indeed a position that deserves to be taken se-
riously.” (275) Now I would agree with Mölder’s assessment of the viability
of cultivating our understanding of mental activity in the fertile grounds of
interpretivism (at least as I understand it), and so I would happily regard
myself as one of his interpretivist neighbors. However, I am not altogether
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sure that he would feel comfortable tilling this ne interpretivist soil with
the specic suite of tools I prefer to deploy. So in the ne spirit of neighborly
cooperation, let me oer Mölder some of these implements from my par-
ticular philosophical toolkit. If he in turn declines to accept them, perhaps
that only shows that we are not trying to put the land to the same benecial
use.
2. Mölder is an orthodox interpretivist in that he believes that “the study
of the mind is the study of the concept of the mind.” (132) According to
his specic ascription theory, one’s believing that p consists in one’s being
“canonically ascribable” as believing that p (170). He takes his account to
be superior to Dennett’s and Davidson’s primarily because we do not need
to assume that a subject will actually behave in a largely rational manner
for it to qualify for Mölder as canonically interpretable. at is, canonically
interpretable subjects may fail to live up to the norms to which interpreters
legitimately take them to be beholden.e major task for Mölder is to show
how that can be so.
3. One of the things that rst struck me about Mölder’s ne book is that
while he devotes ample space to distinguishing his ascription theory from
Dennett’s account of belief via the intentional stance and Davidson’s more
stringent account of mental states arising from considerations of radical in-
terpretation, there is but scant mention of Wilfrid Sellars.2 I for one found
this curious, for if Sellars is not to be located squarely within the interpre-
tivist camp, then he is at least a very close fellow-traveler, and someone to
whomMölder can turn for inspiration. Recall that according to Sellars’ cele-
brated “myth of Jones,” we are instructed that so-called “inner”mental states
are best understood on the model of overt linguistic acts. Indeed, Sellars
takes thinking in its primary sense to be a form of linguistic activity, which
can be done both out loud and in silence to oneself. We could, if we like
(and contra Davidson), extend our account of mentality to encompass pre-
linguistic “proto-thinking,” but only against a primary notion of thinking out
loud in words. So in learning a language, we do not come to attach strings of
phonemes with preexisting ideas; we literally learn to think. Consequently,
Sellars cautions us not to think of speech acts in a Gricean fashion as the
expression of antecedently intelligible mental states. Instead, thinking is a
matter of coming to be bound by norms of rationality and lexical use, which
language trainers are in turn obliged to enforce in language-learners. is
is why actual behavior can deviate spectacularly from rational norms, with-
out thereby disqualifying a subject as a proper subject of interpretation.e
subject has either not yet internalized the relevant norms in play, or is delib-
2 Sellars garners a passing reference to non-conceptual content toward the end ofMind As-
cribed in Chapter 8 (254–5), but that is about all.
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erately outing them (and for the purpose of how we should subsequently
react to the subject, it matters which of these options it is). Moreover, these
norms of rationality might well be themselves subject to criticism and sub-
sequent revision.eremay as yet be future Jonesian geniuses, who teach us
new vocabularies that elaborate our ways of speaking with and interpreting
one another along protable new dimensions.
4. Now if Mölder is receptive to such Sellarsian strains of thought, then
I would quickly urge him to take aboard Sellars’ account of the authority
we grant to subjects’ self-ascriptions of mental states in order to bolster his
Chapter 9 account of self-knowledge. For if Sellars is correct in tying thought
so closely to speech acts, then anyone with a grasp of the concept of belief,
for instance, ought to understand (on the transparency front) that knowing
one’s mind is tantamount to knowing what one is inclined to say and (on the
incorrigibility front) that a self-ascription of some belief would amount to
a commitment to defend the content of that belief. In other words, I think
Mölder would do well to recruit Sellars as an ally in his own ascriptivist,
constitutive account of self-knowledge. Similarly, I would encourageMölder
to take a closer look at Sellars’ notion of ‘sense impressions,’ which seem to
share some features ofMölder’s proto-content in his discussion of perception
in Chapter 8.
5. However, those are but minor suggestions, which concern those lat-
ter portions of the book where Mölder has turned to tracing out the conse-
quences of his view.e real action inMind Ascribed is to be found in those
early chapters in which Mölder devotes his energy to situating and distin-
guishing his ascription theory from what he sees as the major alternatives
in naturalistic philosophy of mind. ere the chief task is that of under-
standing the vexed relationship between mental activity and what Mölder
calls “the natural basis.” And here Mölder is trying to pull o the trick of
being as noncommittal about the metaphysics of mentality as he can, while
at the same time preserving, in the face of threats such as Kim’s exclusion
argument, the folk psychological intuition that mental states are somehow
causally relevant. Roughly, Mölder’s view is that so-called mental proper-
ties are “pleonastic” and that mental vocabulary is deationary and gains
its content primarily against the backdrop of the platitudes of folk psychol-
ogy. By nomeans though, does that entail that the application conditions for
such vocabulary (whichwe can, followingMölder, understand to be the pos-
session conditions for mental states like belief) has no bearing at all on the
applicability ofmore inationary vocabularywhich describes the natural ba-
sis. As he sees it, the major alternatives in the philosophy of mind—various
forms of functionalism and identity theories—generally suer on account of
their failing to appreciate this deationary, pleonastic nature of mental dis-
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course. eir various attempts to reduce, dene, or otherwise domesticate
mental concepts amounts to the unwarranted ination of mental properties.
6. ere is very much to be admired in Mölder’s detailed defense of his
brand of interpretivism over its more naturalistic alternatives, and I proted
immensely from trying to mapMölder’s motivations and solutions onto my
own parochial concerns. If he would aord me some proprietary under-
standings of the terms involved, I suspect I would even endorse many of his
conclusions. And yet there is another curious feature about his work that I
nd both unsettling and telling: this is the account’s downplaying of what
I take to be the essentially normative dimension of mental states and their
ascriptions. Indeed, the word ‘normative’ and its cognates are startlingly ab-
sent from vast tracts of the work (one major exception is Chapter 3.2, in
whichMölder discussesDavidson’s “norms” of rationality)! And yet it would
seem that believers are essentially beings (or “systems,” if you prefer Den-
nett’s idiom) that we can judge to be right or wrong about the way things
are (and on more or less defensible grounds), and intenders are essentially
beings that we can judge as succeeding or failing to make the world t their
designs. Any so-called account of belief or intentional activity that fails to
shoulder the burden of explaining justwhywe should regardmental activity
as subject to such norms of success and correctness would be an account of
intentionality in name only.
7. Overall, Mölder appears in places to acknowledge this essential nor-
mative dimension of the vocabulary of intentionality (see, e.g., 121 and 138).
In the very rst use of the term (71), he observes: “In addition [to a failure to
account for the qualitative dimension of mental discourse], it does not fol-
low from this that neural theories would preserve or replace the normative
relations between mental states.” Still, his explicit appeals to normativity are
sparse, even disguised. is reluctance to lean on normativity is, of course,
entirely consonant with Mölder’s not enlisting Sellars as an immediate or
natural ally. And I suspect it is deliberate, for like so many ying under
the banner of philosophical naturalism, he seems queasy about appealing to
normative concepts. Yet no matter how he might try to hide it, the ascrip-
tion theory would seem to contain a background appeal to the norms of as-
cription placed upon interpreters (as doDavidson’s andDennett’s accounts).
As Mölder also recognizes (96), the discussion of canonical ascription in
Chapter 5 could be read as oering a possible (though non-exhaustive, and
maybe even non-eternal) catalog of such norms. For this reason I can well
imagine that Mölder’s position would not wholly satisfy those stalwart (and
misguided) naturalistic philosophers wishing to banish any and all invoca-
tions of the normative. In fact, their anxieties over unexplained normativity
strikes me to be the real worry behind the various charges of regress and
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circularity traditionally raised against interpretivism. Moreover, invoking
normative-talk also sheds light on the vexed issue of intrinsic or original
intentionality. Teleo-semantic theories, for instance, might well capture a
biological kind of normativity. Still, one might reasonably object that is just
not right sort of normativity to appeal to in order to capture mental activ-
ity in particular. We generally refrain from attributing full-blooded mental
activity to systems (such as many simple artifacts and organisms) that obliv-
iously fail to acknowledge any responsibility for acting in accordance to the
norms to which we take them to be beholden, at least through the adjust-
ment of responses in the face of repeated “failures.” For that reason, folk like
Dretske have the sense that educable creatures, those that can be trained or
that can train themselves, might exhibit a sui generis form of intentionality
by implementing their own individually monitored selection procedures to
help shape their responsive dispositions. us the question of intrinsic or
original intentionality may be seen to be one of characterizing the correct
kind of normativity requisite for bona-de mental activity.3 ose who shy
away from tracking in normative concepts are thus bound to nd such a
distinction a bit mysterious.
8. So I would urge Mölder to avail himself more liberally and explicitly
to what he mentions in a passing footnote (138) as “the normative import of
mental state possession.” For one thing, normativity helps to shed light on
the otherwise peculiar status of the platitudes of folk psychology. AsMölder
recognizes, these platitudes breathe life into mental concepts. However, we
can think of the so-called laws of folk-psychology not so much as empir-
ically veried generalizations but as normative principles guiding our en-
forcement of rational norms. Rather than laws of nature, they are more akin
to proven laws of conduct. Once again, that is why we should emphasize po-
tential rather than actual rationality in any account of intrepretation. While
Dennett might emphasize predictability via the intentional stance to be the
hallmark of the mental, we do not need to think that the prediction and ex-
planation of behavior is the primary purpose of intentional ascription. We
are interested in what other people think, largely because we want to use
them as sources of information, or because we want to knowwhat to do with
them—specically, to determine the degree to which they warrant praise or
blame. As oen as not, cases in which we really want to know what subjects
are thinking turn out to be ones in which they have not done as we expected
them to. e fact that proper subjects of interpretation will regularly do as
3 Dennett, of course, eschews such a project of characterizing distinct kinds of intentionality,
while Davidson notoriously argues that only an explicit, linguistic acknowledgement of a
norm of truth qualies one as a genuine believer. For further discussion, see (Beisecker
2006)
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we expect, may be because they are capable of being, and generally have
been, trained or otherwise conditioned to do as they ought. at is, actual
rationality is not so much a presupposition of our interpretive practices as it
is its product. On this view, then, Dennett’s criterion for appropriate men-
tal ascription—predictability via the intentional stance–is a natural outcome
of the shaping of subjects’ dispositions to the relevant norms (which again
might be somewhat uid and contingent, not timeless and universal).
9. e fact that belief ascription is such a normative aair would partly
explain why Mölder nds the vocabulary of such ascription so pleonastic
and somewhat removed from empirical commitment at the level of the nat-
ural basis. At the end of section 36 in Empiricism and the Philosophy ofMind,
Sellars famously claims that in attributing intentional states, we are not giv-
ing a subject an empirical characterization so much as we are “placing it in
the logical space of reasons” (de Vries and Triplett 2000, 248). at is, it is
not the function of such ascriptions (merely) to describe subjects; its pur-
pose also is to situate those subjects in what folk like Brandom (1994, 158)
like to call “the game of giving and asking for reasons.”at the vocabulary
of intentional ascription serves this additional function, which overshadows
any descriptive one that itmight also have, is of course the centralmotivation
behind recent “neopragmatist” or expressivist unpackings of such vocabu-
lary.4 And insofar as they maintain that the primary function of intentional
vocabulary is largely non-referential and non-descriptive, the chief virtue of
such views is that they can largely sidestep questions about the metaphysical
status of intentionality or what beliefs “really” are. My point is that Mölder
comes mighty close to this form of expressivism when he assures us (70)
that he “do[es] not assume that folk-psychological talk carries ontological
commitments” and moreover, his particular form of metaphysical quietism
begins to sound like neopragmatism when he further tells us (133) that “if
the mental has no deep nature apart from what is involved in our practice
with mental concepts, then the account of such practice would also provide
an account of the mental.” Given world enough and time, I bet that I could
nd a claim expressing a remarkably similar sentiment within the pages of
Making it Explicit.5
10. Interpretivist views such as Sellars’ are sometimes called “norma-
tive functionalisms.”6 Since Mölder limits his understanding of functional
4 Observe that since such expressivist views are careful to show how such vocabulary can
nevertheless be assertive and so participate in our reason-giving practices, they would
qualify as a cognitive form of expressivism, which would elude Mölder’s characterization
and dismissal of non-cognitive expressivisms on 259.
5 Not that I would especially look forward to such a task!
6 See the collection of essays Patrick J. Reider has put together on the Social Epistemology
Review and Reply Collective (Reider 2013).
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role to those given in terms of causal relations, normative functionalism
is a form of common-sense functionalism that does not appear much on
Mölder’s radar (for example, see his characterizations of functionalism on
61 and 134). Like other forms of functional analysis, normative function-
alists attempt to characterize some target phenomenon, not in terms of its
so-called intrinsic features, but rather in terms of its upstream “inputs” and
its downstream “outputs.” However, unlike more familiar causal role func-
tionalisms, functionalisms of this alternate stripe conceive of the relevant
inputs and outputs in broadly normative terms.at is, they attempt to un-
derstand the phenomenon in question in terms of how it is inuenced by,
and how it in turn inuences patterns of proprieties, obligations, and per-
missions (or commitments and entitlements, to deploy Robert Brandom’s
preferred idiom).
11. Normative functionalists tend not to share the philosophical natural-
ist’s anxieties over themetaphysical status of mentality andmental causation
that drives much so-called naturalistic or materialist philosophy of mind.
For that reason, I imagine Mölder would nd a congenial audience among
their ranks, and I think of his view as a form of normative functionalism that
gives pride of place to interpretive statuses. However, normative function-
alists have long been repudiated on their naturalistic credentials. e cost
of pitching matters in a wholly normative, non-naturalistic manner opens
oneself up to the charge of a certain “frictionless spinning in a void.” Insofar
as the normative functionalist is silent about implementation details, then
it might well seem like magic how creatures thoroughly subject to scientic
laws are able to realize the interesting sorts of norm-governed activity the
normative functionalist is seeking to characterize.
12.at is, there remains a genuine concern about explaining how a suit-
ably complex chunk of the material world could possibly also be subject to
mental ascription. As Dretske famously put it, this is the task of explaining
how to “bake a mental cake using only physical yeast and our” (or, rather,
that of writing down the recipe for such a performance) (Dretske 1988, xi).
is task, which is of course related to the engineering ambition that drives
articial intelligence research, would seem to be met by giving in suitably
naturalistic vocabulary a description that would be sucient for the appli-
cation of mental vocabulary. However, we must be very careful here not to
construe this as a call to reduce or to dene the mental in terms of the mate-
rial. While the good naturalistic project is that of giving sucient conditions
for the appropriate application of mental terms, denitions (and conceptual
analysismore generally) will also include necessary conditions as well, which
can in turn (following Dummett) be understood as the downstream conse-
quences of applying those terms.e Sellars passage alluded to above points
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out that the major consequences (and primary purpose) of such application
concern positioning the interpreted subject in the logical space of reasons.
And the central insight behind interpretivism, is that these consequences are
best couched in a normative idiom, including (asMölder fully recognizes on
77), the language of interpretation and understanding that gives this vocab-
ulary its reason for being.
13.e crucial point is that while there are good philosophical and engi-
neering reasons to seek sucient conditions for the applicability of mental
terms in a constrained, “naturalistically respectable” vocabulary, we should
not on that account think that necessary conditions (or consequences of
concept application)must also be couched in such a constrained vocabulary.
e problem with so much naturalistic philosophy of mind is that it fails to
appreciate that necessary conditions for mentality (e.g., consequences of be-
lief possession, or whatMölder calls “constitutive” conditions) are best given
in normative, and not paradigmatically naturalistic, terms.e basic trouble
with (type) identity theories is that, like identity statements generally, they
issue two-way inference tickets, which can illegitimately carry one from a
mental description to a specic material realization. Causal-role function-
alisms attempt to block those illegitimate inferences by issuing only one-way
inference tickets from specicmaterial realizers tting certain causal proles
to mental descriptions. Such accounts oer more abstract characterizations
of sucient conditions for the applicability of mental terms. But insofar as
they are silent about the normative dimensions of the application of such
vocabulary, seeking instead to dene the mental entirely in terms of causal
roles, they are, asMölder tells us (138), irretrievably “incomplete” and far too
reductionist in spirit. Mölder’s complaint that identity theories and causal
role functionalisms illegitimately “inate” mental vocabulary seems to me
to be registering much the same criticism.
14. Nevertheless, there are passages where I suspect Mölder’s apprecia-
tion of this point is not as complete as onemight like. For instance, he should
not be so quick to endorse folk like Baker when they make incautious state-
ments like “having certain kinds of brain statesmay be a necessary condition
for having a belief.” (66) At best, having such brain states is a necessary con-
dition of our having beliefs, given a commitment to materialism and certain
empirical facts about us, which are couched in materialistic terms. Baker’s
error is one of mistaking a necessary condition for what Mackie called an
“INUS condition”: an insucient but necessary portion of a sucient but
unnecessary condition. e specication of such conditions is indeed im-
portant for engineering and implementation concerns. It is signicant to
know that for us, thinking requires a brain. But as Mölder so rightly recog-
nizes over and over again, it would be a mistake to think that having a brain
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is a central feature of one’s analysis of the mental as such. Brain states “drop
out of the picture” and do not guide actual interpretation. (70)
15. Once again, the game that is worth playing is that of specifying in
suitably intelligible vocabulary a blueprint for constructing something that
would meet design specications or targets best specied in intentional or
mental terms. Now it might be that we have not yet developed a vocabulary
on the material side that is adequate to this task, and—particularly in the
case of the so-called qualitative dimensions of mentality—perhaps we never
will. Still, there is no reason whatsoever why either of these vocabularies—
the material on the one hand, and the normatively-freighted mental on the
other—need to be wholly understood or analyzed in terms of the other.
16. In a nutshell, I have been suggesting thatMölder has, perhaps unwit-
tingly, set up shop mighty close to a colony of le-wing Sellarsians, and that
he might protably enlist their aid. At the same time, however, I wonder
whether that is where he really wants to be, and how willing he would be to
take on their peculiar (to some) trappings and vestments, and participate in
their strange (to some) incantations.
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